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Appeal of Component Ratings, Violations of Law, and Noncompliance with Interagency Guidelines (Second Quarter 2026)

Background

A bank supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) filed a formal appeal with the Ombudsman disputing conclusions communicated in a recent report of examination (ROE). Specifically, the bank appealed the following:

  • Component ratings for asset quality, management, and earnings
  • Violation of 12 CFR 21.21(d)(1), “Procedures for Monitoring Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) Compliance; System of Internal Controls”
  • Violation of 12 CFR 21.21(d)(3), “Procedures for Monitoring BSA Compliance; BSA Officer (BSAO)”
  • Violation of 12 CFR 160.101(b)(1)(i), “Real Estate Lending Standards”
  • Noncompliance with 12 CFR 30.A.II.C.4, “Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safety and Soundness: Operational and Managerial Standards; Loan Documentation”
  • Noncompliance with 12 CFR 30.A.II.D.6, “Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safety and Soundness; Operational and Managerial Standards; Credit Underwriting”
  • Assessment of noncompliance with the BSA/Anti-Money Laundering (BSA/AML) article of the enforcement action.

Discussion

The appeal disputed the conclusion of noncompliance with 12 CFR 30.A.II.C.4 and 12 CFR 30.A.II.D.6, contending that the bank’s written underwriting policies complied with OCC lending guidelines. The appeal asserted that the SO’s scrutiny of the bank’s underwriting represented a standard that is neither a regulatory requirement nor an industry standard and that the criticisms of underwriting and loan documentation were not substantive deficiencies that affected the validity of the loan documents or the borrower’s ability-to-repay (ATR). The appeal stated that the ROE’s findings were not reflective of bank practices during the examination because the examiners’ loan sample included loans that pre-dated the bank implementing policy and process improvements.

The appeal disputed the violation of 12 CFR 160(b)(1)(i). The appeal contended that the ROE did not identify or criticize any written bank policy but instead disagreed with the decision making of underwriters, which had no relationship to whether the substance of written policies was consistent with the safe and sound banking practices required under 12 CFR 160(b)(1)(i).

The appeal disputed the internal controls pillar violation, noting that the ROE explicitly stated that the bank’s BSA/AML program met the minimum requirements of 12 CFR 21.21. The appeal noted that the bank’s procedures required the referral of loans with indications of suspicious activity to the BSAO for review and a recent third-party audit firm determined the structure was satisfactory. The appeal asserted that the BSA/AML criticisms within the ROE would require individualized, manual review of potentially suspicious activity, which is an onerous standard and an excessive level of regulatory scrutiny that is disproportionate to the bank’s size and risk profile. The appeal contended that the ROE failed to acknowledge improvements that management implemented to enhance tracking and reporting. The appeal further stated that the SO criticized the same risk assessment that it found to be adequate in a prior review.

The appeal disputed the BSAO pillar violation, asserting that the bank met the regulatory requirements to designate an individual(s) responsible for coordinating and monitoring day-to-day compliance. The appeal asserted that the BSAO had the necessary qualifications.

The appeal disputed the assessment of noncompliance with the BSA/AML article of the enforcement action, noting that the ROE provided no adequate basis to change the article from “in compliance” to “not in compliance.” The appeal asserted that the SO arbitrarily changed its conclusion that the bank is not in compliance with the enforcement action article despite previously endorsing the bank’s transaction monitoring approach.

The appeal disputed the asset quality component rating downgrade to a 3. The appeal contended that the SO applied unwarranted criticisms related to loan underwriting and documentation to the component rating. The appeal asserted that the ROE minimized the bank’s favorable credit metrics and the bank’s long-term history of originating high quality loans. The appeal disagreed with the conclusion that repurchase risk may extend for the life of the loans and noted that this unsupported speculation could not support a 3 rating.

The appeal disputed the earnings component rating downgrade to a 3. The appeal challenged the conclusion that earnings were insufficient and noted that earnings supported operations, as demonstrated by positive net income, augmented capital, and ability to support the allowance for credit losses (ACL). The appeal contended that the SO considered the wrong peer group when developing its earnings rating and failed to consider the bank’s size and sophistication, nature and complexity of activities, and risk profile. The appeal asserted that the SO did not sufficiently consider the bank’s positive return on average assets and net interest margin, which compared favorably to peers.

The appeal disputed the downgrade of the management component rating from 3 to 4. The appeal contended that the SO’s criticisms of the bank’s lending practices were unsupported, and the BSA/AML criticisms were improper, disproportionate to the bank’s size and risk profile, and contained erroneous conclusions. The appeal asserted that the criticisms outlined in the ROE signaled a level of regulatory scrutiny disproportionate to the size and risk profile of the bank and that the bank’s residential mortgage lending activities reflected standards and practices consistent with the size and complexity of the bank and the nature and scope of its lending activities.

Supervisory Standards

The Ombudsman conducted a comprehensive review of the appeal using the following supervisory standards in effect at the time of the examination:

Conclusions

The Ombudsman issued an overall split decision on the appeal. The Ombudsman concurred with the SO on all appeal issues except for the violation of 12 CFR 21.21(d)(3) (BSA Officer pillar). The Ombudsman concurred with the bank that the BSAO pillar violation was not supported.

The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision to cite noncompliance with lending guidelines outlined in 12 CFR 30.A.II.C.4 and 12 CFR 30.A.II.D.6. Loan documentation practices were insufficient based on suspicious information indicating potential fraud within the loan sample. Per 12 CFR 30.A.II.C.4, “[a]n institution should establish and maintain loan documentation practices that…  [d]emonstrate appropriate administration and monitoring of a loan.” Examiners identified suspicious information in a significant percentage of the loans sampled. The bank’s practices, specifically its reliance on underwriters and quality control (QC) staff to identify and take appropriate action, were ineffective. The bank’s lending business model with broker-provided documentation heightened the risk of potential fraud. Supervisory standards highlight the need for controls to ensure accurate and complete information. Insufficient controls to identify fraudulent documentation for loans can directly impact the financial condition of a bank.

Credit underwriting practices were inappropriate given the bank’s focus on broker-sourced documentation. Per 12 CFR 30.A.II.D.6, “[a]n institution should establish and maintain prudent credit underwriting practices that… [a]re appropriate to the size of the institution and the nature and scope of its activities.” The significant level of suspicious information within the loan sample calls into question the borrowers’ creditworthiness and ATR. Despite these suspicious items, the bank originated the loans without questioning the veracity of documents or investigating the irregularities. The lack of escalation or follow-up on discrepancies within key documents used to assess financial capacity supports the ineffective underwriting conclusion. Supervisory standards emphasize the importance of data integrity during the underwriting process and strong controls to manage mortgage fraud risk, particularly when a bank has significant origination volume and relies significantly on third parties.

The appeal arguments pertaining to OCC lending guidelines did not address the noncompliance with Appendix A of Part 30—12 CFR 30.A.II.C.4 and 12 CFR 30.A.II.D.6 cited in the ROE. The examiners identified, and the Ombudsman independently verified, numerous instances of gift letters with inaccuracies and inconsistent and/or suspicious signatures. It is not unreasonable to expect underwriters and QC staff to review key ability to repay documents in detail, inclusive of reviewing for errors, inconsistent signatures, irregularities, or other indicators of fraud. The suspicious loan documents that the examiners identified were material. Potential fraud, including misrepresented profit and loss statements, altered documents, unsupported stated earnings, inaccurate dates, conflicting tax preparer claims, and inconsistent signatures, not only call into question the specific instance or line item identified but also the entire document and all documents for that borrower and from that broker. The bank’s policy changes were unrelated to concerns the examiners identified in the most recent ROE. In addition, the bank originated most loans sampled after the policy and process improvements, and concerns identified in the newer loans still supported the SO’s conclusions.

The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision to cite the violation of 12 CFR 160.101(b)(1)(i) for real estate lending standards. Policies and procedures were insufficient for the bank’s risk and contributed to suspicious activity being unidentified and not escalated. Per 12 CFR 160.101, “[r]eal estate lending policies adopted pursuant to this section must …  Be consistent with safe and sound banking practices.” Although bank policies included some high-level guidance related to potential fraud and other suspicious behavior for staff, existing policy statements were insufficient given the risk profile. The existence of policies alone is not sufficient to comply with the regulation if those policies are not effective in achieving their objectives. In this case, the bank’s insufficient policies led to underwriters not escalating suspicious loan documents.

The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision to cite the violation of 12 CFR 21.21(d)(1) (internal controls pillar). The bank failed to implement effective internal controls to establish an effective BSA compliance program. Ineffective suspicious activity monitoring and risk assessment processes adversely affected compliance with the BSA regulatory requirements via unidentified potential fraud in several loans. The significant risk that fraud can pose to the financial condition of a bank supports supervisory expectations for robust detection and prevention of fraud.

Suspicious activity monitoring and reporting processes were weak. The bank lacked appropriate internal controls to identify, escalate, investigate, and report loan-related suspicious activity. The BSAO did not receive sufficient or timely information to effectively oversee lending-related suspicious activity. BSA procedures required staff to report potential mortgage fraud to the BSAO. However, the suspicious activity monitoring process was ineffective based on suspicious activity identified during the examination and the lack of BSAO referrals during the examination cycle. The bank’s processes to escalate suspicious activity during underwriting were informal. Quality assurance testing, to ensure lending activities met regulatory requirements and internal procedures, was not completed despite it being required by bank procedures. The satisfactory rating from a third-party audit with no findings related to the bank’s suspicious activity identification and reporting processes does not negate examiners’ findings. Based on the audit testing procedures and work papers, auditors did not review mortgage underwriting source documents that would allow them to identify the potential fraud identified in the examination sample. The SO did not consider the bank’s updated tracking and reporting process because examiners completed examination testing prior to their implementation.

The concerns identified during the examination prompted examiners to conduct a closer review of the bank’s BSA/AML risk assessment. The examiners found that the risk assessment did not appropriately capture key risks and corresponding controls. The risk assessment was not tailored to the bank’s unique risks, resulting in unsupported inherent and residual risk conclusions. The risk assessment did not properly address the risk of brokers providing fraudulent or altered documentation to the bank. Failure to have an effective risk assessment process limits the board and management’s ability to identify suspicious activity and develop appropriate internal controls.

The appeal assertion that the pillar violation was not supported because the ROE stated the BSA/AML program met the minimum requirements of 12 CFR 21.21 misinterpreted the hierarchy of BSA supervisory criticisms. Pillar violations are cited when deficiencies do not rise to the level of an overall program failure but represent systemic or recurring noncompliance in one or more of the pillars. Therefore, a bank may meet the minimum program requirements of 12 CFR 21.21 while still incurring one or more individual pillar violations.

The Ombudsman concurred with the bank that a violation of 12 CFR 21.21(d)(3) (BSAO pillar) was not sufficiently supported. While the SO identified certain weaknesses attributed to the BSAO, BSA deficiencies were primarily centered in the bank’s internal controls rather than the BSAO. The BSAO was qualified based on BSA/AML experience and an industry certification. As noted previously, a bank may meet the minimum program requirements of 12 CFR 21.21 while still incurring one or more individual pillar violations. However, in this case, BSAO concerns did not rise to the severity of a pillar violation.

The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s assessment of noncompliance with the BSA/AML article of the enforcement action. Per PPM 5310-3, enforcement action articles designated as “in compliance” are subject to regular evaluation and can fall out of compliance at any time until the enforcement action is terminated. Despite the board and management’s prior actions, the bank’s policies, procedures, and systems failed to address requirements in the article; namely, maintaining an effective system of internal controls. Examiners identified new information and circumstances that warranted the compliance status change, specifically related to suspicious activity identification, escalation, investigation, and reporting in the loan underwriting process.

The Ombudsman concurred with the rating of 3 for the asset quality component. As noted previously, the Ombudsman agreed with the loan underwriting and documentation criticisms, and the adequacy of underwriting standards, soundness of credit administration practices, and adequacy of internal controls are evaluation factors for the asset quality rating. Suspicious activity identification, escalation, investigation, and reporting in the underwriting process needed improvement. Policies and procedures were insufficient for the bank’s risk and contributed to suspicious activity being unidentified and not escalated. The mortgage portfolio, representing a significant concentration, presented heightened credit risk, particularly given potential fraud identified in the loan sample. Positive lagging credit indicators did not accurately reflect the level of credit risk, given the risk of fraud in both the on-balance sheet and sold portfolios as well as the unseasoned nature of much of the portfolio. Underwriting concerns, including potential fraud, may not reveal performance issues (repayment and repurchase risk) until the borrower experiences changes in circumstance, most commonly occurring in adverse economic or other conditions. The repurchase term does not eliminate the risk that the bank could be required to repurchase loans if fraud is present.

The Ombudsman concurred with the rating of 3 for the earnings component. Earnings may not fully support operations and provide for the accretion of capital and ACL levels in relation to the institution’s overall condition, growth, and other factors affecting the quality, quantity, and trend of earnings. The SO considered the applicable factors outlined in the rating definition when developing the earnings rating, including the bank’s overall condition, growth, and other factors impacting the rating. Earnings had improved since the prior examination, but the bank had not yet demonstrated sufficient earnings stability, particularly given the bank’s less than satisfactory condition, weak risk management, and growth strategy. Contrary to the appeal assertion, the ROE did not discuss any peer comparisons and, while earnings metrics compared favorably to peers, comparisons did not account for bank-specific factors, including the significant concerns identified at the examination.

The Ombudsman concurred with the rating of 4 for the management component. A downgrade in the management component rating was supported, consistent with OCC Bulletin 2012-30 and the rating definition. During the examination, examiners identified several new concerns in addition to prior concerns that remained outstanding. The level of problems, including violations of law, noncompliance with interagency guidelines, and open matters requiring attention, was excessive. The bank had not demonstrated the ability to correct identified issues and maintain satisfactory board and management performance.

The Ombudsman concluded that the SO’s underwriting criticisms were supported as practices were not consistent with the size and complexity of the bank and the nature and scope of its lending activities. Weaknesses in the BSA audit, training, and oversight, combined with the previously addressed internal control deficiencies, contributed to the management component rating downgrade. Given the significant risk that reliance on fraudulent underwriting documentation poses to an institution’s financial condition, the SO’s expectations that the bank establish more robust procedures and policies for identifying and escalating fraud were not unreasonable. Establishing more robust processes for detecting fraud is important for the bank’s safety and soundness and to prevent harm to the institution’s financial condition.